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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Fredy Heredia-Juarez appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition 
for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
For his part in the robbery of a credit union and the murder of Jessie 
Aaron Coates, and pursuant to a written plea offer (Respondent's Ex. 4), 
Heredia-Juarez pied guilty to first degree murder and robbery in exchange for the 
dismissal of two additional charges of robbery and a conspiracy to commit 
murder charge as well as the qgreement of the state to limit the fixed portion of 
its sentencing recommendation to 35 years (8/09/2007 Tr., p.4, L.21 - p.6, L.18; 
p.19, L.16 - p.32, L.6). Additionally, Heredia-Juarez waived his right file a direct 
appeal addressing any aspect of his judgment or sentence if imposed in a 
manner not exceeding the recommendations of the state. (8/09/2007 Tr., p.6, 
L.20 - p.8, L.7.) 
Heredia-Juarez moved to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing based on 
his assertion that he was led to believe he would be facing a sentence of 
anywhere from 10 to 35 years instead of the possible life sentence available to 
the court at sentencing. (1/31/2008 Tr., p.79, L.13 - p.81, L.5.) The district court 
denied Heredia-Juarez's motion to withdraw his guilty plea finding there was no 
"just cause to withdraw the plea of guilty." (1/31/2008 Tr., p.175, Ls.22-23.) The 
court imposed a unified sentence of 15 years with the first five years fixed on the 
robbery conviction and a unified indeterminate life sentence with the first 35 
1 
years fixed for Heredia-Juarez's murder conviction. (5/09/2008 Tr., p.295, L.17 -
p.296, L.22.) Because Heredia-Juarez waived his right to appeal as part of the 
plea negotiations provided the court did not exceed the maximum sentence 
recommended by the state, the court "decline[d] to advise [Heredia-Juarez] that 
[he had] any appeal rights." (5/09/2008 Tr., p.297, Ls.13-17.) 
Heredia-Juarez then appealed. The state objected to Heredia-Juarez's 
filing of an appeal based on his waiver of his right to appeal pursuant to a Rule 
11 agreement. (#35367, 1/21/2009 Motion to Dismiss and Statement in Support 
Thereof.) The Supreme Court Granted the state's motion and dismissed 
Heredia-Juarez's appeal, filing a Remittitur to that effect March 17, 2009. 
(#35367 Remittitur.) 
Heredia-Juarez filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief 
asserting five separate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., pp.5-12.) 
The state filed an answer and a motion for summary dismissal and brief in 
support thereof for Heredia-Juarez's failure to raise any genuine issues of 
material fact or any claims on which post-conviction relief could be granted. (R., 
pp.32-82.) Heredia-Juarez filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief 
through counsel asserting seven claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: 1) 
he was not provided with adequate translation in his dealings with his attorneys, 
which prevented him from understanding what was happening in his case, 2) he 
was not provided copies of the state's responses to discovery requests, 3) he 
was coerced into pleading guilty, 4) he was insufficiently advised of the risks of 
taking a polygraph exam while being advised to submit to such at the request of 
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the state, 5) counsel failed to properly advise him of his right to remain silent 
during court ordered pre-sentence examinations, 6) counsel failed to argue the 
correct standard of proof during the hearing on Heredia-Juarez's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, and 7) his appellate counsel committed errors in the 
course of his representation on direct appeal. (R., pp.120-126.) The state filed 
an answer to the amended petition, incorporating its previous filings with the 
court, and requested Heredia-Juarez's petition be summarily dismissed for failure 
to raise any genuine issue of material fact upon which he was entitled to relief. 
(R., pp.135-138.) 
Following a hearing on the motion for summary dismissal, the district court 
dismissed Heredia-Juarez's petition for post-conviction relief and entered a 
judgment of dismissal. (R., pp.172-176.) 
Heredia-Juarez timely appealed. (R., pp.177-182.) 
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ISSUES 
Heredia-Juarez states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Heredia's 
petition for post-conviction relief because he established an issue of fact 
as to whether he received effective assistance of trial counsel? 
2. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Heredia's 
petition for post-conviction relief because he established an issue of fact 
as to whether he received effective assistance of appellate counsel? 
(Appellant's brief, pp.3-4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as follows: 
Has Heredia-Juarez failed to show error in the district court's summary 
dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
Heredia-Juarez Has Failed To Carry His Appellate Burden Of Showing Error In 
The Summary Dismissal Of His Post-Conviction Petition 
A Introduction 
At the hearing on the state's motion for summary dismissal, post-
conviction counsel withdrew three claims from the amended petition for post-
conviction relief. Counsel for Heredia-Juarez first withdrew the claim that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately provide translation of information 
to Heredia-Juarez into Spanish. (12/20/2010 Tr., p.9, Ls. 16-21.) Next, counsel 
for Heredia-Juarez withdrew the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for 
failure to adequately advise Heredia-Juarez of his Estrada 1 rights prior to his 
presentence investigation and psychological examination. (12/20/2010 Tr., p.9, 
L.s.22-25.) Finally, counsel for Heredia-Juarez withdrew the claim that counsel 
was ineffective for arguing the incorrect standard of proof at the hearing on 
Heredia-Juarez's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (12/20/2010 Tr., p.10, Ls.2-
6.) Following a hearing on the motion to summarily dismiss the remaining four 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the district court granted the state's 
motion, dismissing Heredia-Juarez's petition for post-conviction relief. (R., 
pp.172-176; 12/20/2010Tr., p.72, Ls.4-6.) 
On appeal, Heredia-Juarez claims the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel with the respect to 
1 Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006). 
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the entry of his plea and his submission to a polygraph examination.2 
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-10.) Heredia-Juarez further asserts the district court 
erred in summarily dismissing his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel by finding the claim moot based on his waiver of his appeal rights 
because "the term of the plea agreement by which [Heredia-Juarez] agreed to 
give up his right to appeal should not be construed as precluding his ability to 
appeal the district court [sic] refusal to allow him to withdraw his appeal." 
(Appellant's brief, p.12.) 
Heredia-Juarez's arguments on appeal fail. He has not shown that the 
district court erred in summarily dismissing his post-conviction relief petition. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court's 
application of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State, 
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001). On appeal rrom summary 
dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court reviews the record to 
determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the 
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Matthews v. 
State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State, 
132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts freely 
review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, 
Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852,727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986). 
2Heredia-Juarez does not challenge on appeal the district court's summary 
dismissal of the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to 
provide him with copies of the state's discovery responses. 
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C. General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil 
proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State, 
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). However, a petition for post-conviction 
relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain 
more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a 
complaint. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 522 (referencing I.R.C.P. 8). 
The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal knowledge and 
produce admissible evidence to support his allegations. kl_ (citing I.C. § 19-
4903). Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application 
must be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary 
hearing. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982); 
Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative. 'To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to 
summary dismissal pursuant to I. C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence raises 
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no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's claims. 
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. Whfle a court must accept a 
petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept 
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible 
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 
P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 
(2001)). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief, 
the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing 
the petition. kl (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 
(1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting 
of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original 
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." & 
D. Heredia-Juarez Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In 
Summarily Dismissing His Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Trial 
Counsel 
The district court held a hearing on the state's motion for summary 
judgment. Following the withdrawal of three separate claims by Heredia-Juarez, 
the court heard argument relating to Heredia-Juarez's remaining three 
allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel: 1) that he did not receive 
copies of the state's discovery responses from his attorney, 2) that he was 
coerced into pleading guilty based on a misrepresentation to him of the sentence 
he was facing, and 3) that he was not properly advised that his submission to a 
polygraph examination may be used against him in the future. The district court 
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determined Heredia-Juarez had failed to meet his burden and granted the state's 
motion, dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative. "To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, when a post-conviction petitioner alleges 
ineffective assistance of counsel, in order to survive summary dismissal of his 
petition, he must specifically show that "(1) a material issue of fact exists as to 
whether counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) a material issue of fact 
exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced the applicant's case." Baldwin v. 
State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d 362, 367-68 (2008) (internal citations 
omitted). "To establish deficient assistance, the burden is on the petitioner to 
show that his attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. This objective standard embraces a strong presumption that 
trial counsel was competent and diligent." .[Q_,_ "[S]trategic or tactical decisions 
will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable 
of objective evaluation." .[Q_,_ "To establish prejudice, the claimant must show a 
reasonable probability that but for his attorney's deficient performance the 
outcome of the proceeding would have been different." .[Q_,_ 
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On appeal, Heredia-Juarez contests the dismissal of only the second two 
bases of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, asserting the trial court erred in 
dismissing his petition because Heredia-Juarez's trial counsel was "ineffective for 
convincing [him] to accept the plea agreement without ensuring that he fully 
understood the terms of the plea bargain" (Appellant's brief, p.6) and failed to 
make sure Heredia-Juarez sufficiently "understood the ramifications of submitting 
to the polygraph," because had trial counsel done so Heredia-Juarez "would not 
have agreed to it" (Appellant's brief, pp.9-10). 
The district court, in determining Heredia-Juarez failed to provide 
"adequate proof to establish either prong of Strickland" in regards to the claim of 
coercion of a guilty plea, found: 
The only fact, in my review of the record, that is not conclusory as 
to this allegation in its entirety is that the attorneys told him, that is 
Mr. Heredia, what to say to the court in response to inquiries from 
the court in direct contravention of his stated position to the 
attorneys. That is now made clear in the affidavit of Mr. Heredia, 
and it's noted in paragraph five, that during the change of plea 
hearing, he did ask for time to speak to his lawyers and that it's 
stated that [trial counsel] hold [sic] him to say that he aided and 
abetted, that he did not do the crime but that he didn't do anything 
to stop it and so forth. 
(12/20/2010 Tr., p.66, Ls.12-25.) The court went on to outline the remaining 
information in Heredia-Juarez's affidavit as well as the testimony from the change 
of plea hearing which contradicted Heredia-Juarez's conclusory allegation that he 
did not receive adequate information regarding the nature of the sentence he 
could receive and was therefore coerced into pleading guilty through his 
attorney's faulty advice. (12/20/2010 Tr., p.67, L.1 - p.68, L.16.) The court 
correctly determined Heredia-Juarez's "conclusory statement without any facts of 
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force, threat, [or] intimidation" were insufficient to "provide the adequate proof to 
establish either prong of Strickland," specifically where the district court had 
before it the plea colloquy wherein Heredia-Juarez was thoroughly advised of the 
terms of the negotiation, Heredia-Juarez testified under oath as to his role in the 
murder, and the statements of his attorneys which, instead of being coercive, 
could be viewed as counsel's advice that Heredia-Juarez had received the best 
offer he was going to receive. (12/20/2010 Tr., p.67, L.20 - p.68, L.6.) 
Heredia-Juarez next asserts on appeal that trial counsel's performance 
was deficient because Heredia-Juarez was not informed by counsel that if he 
submitted to the polygraph examination in order to negotiate a better plea 
bargain, it could be used against him later. (Appellant's brief, p.9.) Had he 
understood the potential "ramifications of submitting to the polygraph," Heredia-
Juarez asserts on appeal, "he would not have agreed to it." (Appellant's brief, 
p.10.) Heredia-Juarez contends the district court erred in concluding he "had not 
met the prejudice prong even if counsel's performance was deficient." 
(Appellant's brief, p.10.) 
The district court correctly determined Heredia-Juarez failed to establish 
an issue of material fact regarding his claim that he was prejudiced by the 
alleged failure of trial counsel to advise him that the results of the polygraph 
examination he was submitting to in order to secure a better bargaining position 
with the state could be used against him in the future if it was determined he had 
not been truthful. In dismissing the claim, the court found: 
[T]hose facts establish that this was not a one-sided situation but 
an effort to resolve this case short of what has brought it to this 
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point, the claim for Mr. Heredia is that [trial counsel] never 
explained to him before the test the polygraph could be used 
against him later by the state and never told him [the prosecutor] 
could see the test if it was bad for [Heredia-Juarez]. [Heredia-
Juarez] would not have taken the polygraph if [he] had known these 
things, that fact is taken as Mr. Heredia's assertion; however, it is, 
in this court's view, again as the finder of fact, eventually, 
contradicted by the record here, in the sense that [trial counsel] 
accompanied Mr. Heredia to the polygraph interview, which the 
court has taken notice of and reviewed, as submitted by the parties, 
the officer asks Mr. Heredia if he understood English. The 
petitioner said he did. The officer then read Mr. Heredia his rights 
and asked the petitioner to say yes after each statement to indicate 
if Mr. Heredia understood these rights. The officer then read to Mr. 
Heredia his rights, and Mr. Heredia indicated affirmatively, yes, to 
each question. The rights included the right to remain silent, and 
anything that he said could be used against him in a court of law. 
Furthermore, the petitioner signed a document 
acknowledging these rights. Initially, he wanted to talk with officers 
and also, prior to the polygraph being administered the officer 
allowed Mr. Heredia the choice to list what questions he could or 
couldn't be required to answer. He understood the right to have a 
lawyer present. [Trial counsel] was present with him at that time. 
And so, based upon that fact, in the record those facts are clear, 
this court concludes that, even if it was a risky procedure or, I 
believe argued, a risky tactic to allow this to take place, that it was 
done so with petitioner's full knowledge and these warnings having 
been given, that the prejudice prong of this risky tactic and strategy 
on [trial counsel's] part has not been established, because it's at 
this point alleged, I guess, that this polygraph wouldn't have been 
undertaken absent [trial counsel's] failure to say, hey, this can be 
used against you later. But the police told him that very thing. He 
went ahead and did it; and, therefore, I don't find that the prejudice 
prong has been established[.] 
(12/20/2010 Tr., p.69, L.5 - p.71, L.6.) The court was correct in its conclusion 
that Heredia-Juarez's bare assertion that he was prejudiced by his counsel failing 
to advise him of the potential use of the polygraph exam against him was 
contradicted by the evidence before the court showing Heredia-Juarez was 
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informed of his Miranda3 rights prior to the start of the exam, thus providing him 
with the knowledge that the information could be used against him if his attempts 
to negotiate a resolution did not come to fruition. Heredia-Juarez has failed to 
show error in the summary dismissal of this claim. 
E. Heredia-Juarez Has Failed to Establish That The District Court Erred In 
Summarily Dismissing His Claim Of Ineffective Assistance of Appellate 
Counsel 
In his amended petition for post-conviction relief, Heredia-Juarez alleged 
his appellate counsel was ineffective for the following: 
That counsel for petitioner on appeal, ... , committed errors in the 
course of his representation of petitioner on direct appeal to the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. Specifically, petitioner's attorney at the 
sentencing hearing, ... , objected to the State's use (and the Court's 
consideration) of the results of the above-stated polygraph 
examination during the course of sentencing. This issue was 
properly preserved for appeal. That petitioner did not waive his 
right to appeal this issue to the appellate court by his entry in to the 
plea agreement in this matter. That said appellate counsel did not 
at any time confer with petitioner about the appellate proceedings 
nor the issues to be raised therein. That appellate counsel failed to 
raise said issue on appeal, and therefore, said issue was precluded 
from consideration by the appellate court(s). That, ultimately, the 
appeal of petitioner to the Idaho Court of Appeals was dismissed. 
(R., p.125.) In dismissing this claim, the district court found Heredia-Juarez had 
waived his right to appeal as part of plea negotiations in the case: 
The final claim is the appellate claim relative to appeal, 
counsel failing to confer with Mr. Heredia about his proceedings 
and issue to be raised and failing to raise the polygraph issue on 
appeal. The court dismisses this claim on the basis of the plea 
offer at paragraph four, upon the finding of the appellate court that 
this issue, though raised, was moot based upon a plea agreement 
between Mr. Heredia and the state; and, therefore, appellate 
counsel cannot be found to have been ineffective where Mr. 
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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Heredia bargained that away initially, and there has been no claim 
raised here that somehow his trial counsel were ineffective for 
allowing him to bargain that away, only that appellate counsel was 
somehow ineffective; and this court finds that to be a moot issue 
based on the order of the Supreme Court dismissing the appeal 
and the appellate waiver agreed upon in the plea agreement with 
the state. 
(12/20/2010 Tr., p.71, L.8 - p.72, L.3.) 
Heredia-Juarez asserts for the first time on appeal that his waiver of his 
appellate rights did not extend to his right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, p.11) As such, he claims the district 
court's conclusion that whether or not counsel was "ineffective for failing to confer 
with [Heredia-Juarez] regarding the issues to be presented was moot because 
[he] waived his right to appeal in the plea agreement" was in error. (Appellant's 
brief, p.11.) Heredia-Juarez's argument fails, however, because what he argues 
on appeal is not the claim preserved in his amended petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
Claims asserted in post-conviction proceedings, as in civil matters 
generally, must be raised in the petition. I.C. § 19-4903; I.R.C.P. 3(a). The 
mechanism provided for raising new claims is a motion to amend the petition. 
I.R.C.P. 1 S(a) (after answer filed a pleading may be amended "only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the adverse party"). Here, Heredia-Juarez 
asserted that appellate counsel had been ineffective for failing to appeal the 
district court's denial of their request to prevent the state from using the results of 
Heredia-Juarez's polygraph examination at sentencing. The issue raised on 
appeal, the ineffectiveness of trial counsel for failing to appeal the district court's 
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denial of Heredia-Juarez's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, has not been 
preserved and is not properly before this court 
Although not argued by Heredia-Juarez on appeal, the district court 
correctly denied his claim alleging ineffectiveness of appellate counsel for failing 
to appeal the court's decision allowing the state to rely on information from 
Heredia-Juarez's polygraph examination at sentencing. As pointed out by the 
district court, Heredia-Juarez did not challenge the underlying waiver of his 
appellate rights. In the face of such waiver of all appeal rights Heredia-Juarez's 
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the use of 
the polygraph at sentencing as an issue was unsustainable. 
Heredia-Juarez's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was 
not amended from his amended petition for post-conviction relief. As it relates to 
the claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel for failure to challenge the trial 
court's decision, over Heredia-Juarez's objection, to use evidence from the 
polygraph examination at sentencing, the district court correctly dismissed such 
claim. (12/20/2010 Tr., p.71, L.8- p.72, L.3.) 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
orders summarily dismissing Heredia-Juarez's petition for post-conviction relief. 
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